Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 97

Issue 1

Article 3

2008

Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing First
Amendment Rights of Public School Employees
Neal H. Hutchens
Barry University

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Hutchens, Neal H. (2008) "Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing First Amendment Rights of
Public School Employees," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 97: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol97/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate:
The Diminishing First Amendment Rights
of Public School Employees
Neal H. Hutchens'
INTRODUCTION

THE Supreme Court's statement that along with students, teachers
do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate"' is an often discussed premise in
federal court decisions.3 But, the ever increasing reality is that teachers,
along with administrators and other staff in public schools, increasingly
possess diminished protection under the First Amendment. 4 Garcetti v.
Ceballos,5 which dealt with the First Amendment speech rights of all public
employees, 6 marks the erosion of First Amendment rights for public school
administrators and staff and may curtail the First Amendment rights of
I Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law; J.D. 2002, University
of Alabama School of Law; Ph.D. in Education Policy, University of Maryland, 2007. As a
former legal intern to the U.S. Department of Education's Office of the General Counsel and
having served previously as a legislative fellow to the U.S. Senate's Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, the author has long been immersed in education law and
policy. He would like to thank Megan Bittakis and Heather Kolinsky for their comments and
suggestions on this Article.
2 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court
for almost 50 years.").
3 See, e.g., Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F3d 687, 693 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S.Ct. 387 (2007); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 2z8 E3d 1003, ioo9 (9th Cir. zooo); Ward
v. Hickey, 996 F2d 448,452 (1St Cir. 1993).
4 See generally Donald F. Uerling, Academic Freedom in K-12 Education, 79 NEB. L. REv.
956 (2ooo) (discussing how despite some early decisions supportive of academic freedom
for teachers, courts have generally, with some exceptions, upheld the authority of school
officials to control the classroom communications of teachers); Kevin G. Welner, Locking Up the
Marketplace of Ideas andLocking Out School Reform: Courts' Imprudent Treatment of Controversial
Teaching in America's Public Schools, 50 UCLA L. REv. 959 (2003) (noting how more recent
legal decisions have often tended to deny or severely restrict First Amendment rights for
teachers).
5 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2oo6).

6 For a discussion of the impact of Garcettion public employees in general, see Sheldon
H. Nahmod, PublicEmployee Speech, CategoricalBalancing and§ 1983: A Critique of Garcettiv.
Ceballos,42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008).
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teachers as well. In Garcetti,the Supreme Court held that when a public
employee makes statements as part of his or her official duties, then such
statements are not considered protected speech for purposes of the First
Amendment.' In relation to teachers, at least one federal circuit court has
relied on the decision to deny teachers any meaningful First Amendment
speech rights based on communications made in the classroom.8 Following
that decision, public elementary and secondary education employees 9
now face an environment with no First Amendment protections for
communications made in performing various professional duties, including
classroom-related communications by teachers.
This Article examines the current state of speech rights of public
elementary and secondary school employees, especially in relation to the
impact of Garcetti. Part I provides an overview of the Garcetti decision,
and Part II reviews selected post-Garretti decisions dealing with First
Amendment claims by public school administrators and teachers. Part III
considers some of the negative aspects that may result when the Garcetti
standards are applied to communications by public education employees.
Garcetti additionally raises questions regarding whether public school
teachers possess any special First Amendment rights for in-class related
speech, including any rights grounded in academic freedom. In Part IV, the
Article provides an overview of the unsettled legal status of constitutional
protections for individual academic freedom and looks specifically at the
legal standards courts have applied to evaluate in-class communications by
teachers. The Article concludes with several suggestions to provide legal
protection under certain circumstances to communications made by public
elementary and secondary teachers and administrators.
I. GARCrri V. CEBALLOS

A. Background and Procedural History
In Garcetti, a deputy district attorney, Richard Ceballos, recommended
dismissal of a criminal case based on alleged misrepresentations in an
affidavit used to obtain a search warrant.' 0 Ceballos, who exercised certain
supervisory duties, was contacted by a defense attorney seeking to have
the case reviewed. Ceballos then made the recommendation for dismissal
7 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 42 1.
8 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch., 474 F3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating"...
Mayer's current-events lesson was part of her assigned tasks in the classroom; Garcetti applies
directly"), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. i6o (2007).
9 Id. Though not the focus of this Article, the Garcetti decision also impacts higher
education administrators at public colleges and universities and, potentially, speech by college
and university faculty members as well.
to Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414.
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after visiting the location described in the affidavit and determining that
the affidavit contained "serious misrepresentations."" In addition to
discussing his concerns with supervisors, Ceballos wrote a memorandum
recommending dismissal of the case." Despite his concerns, Ceballos's
supervisors refused to dismiss the case. 3 During a hearing concerning the
search warrant, the defense questioned Ceballos, who revealed his views
on the affidavit. 4 In a lawsuit, Ceballos claimed that his superiors retaliated
against him because of the incident, including changing his duties and
transferring him to another courthouse." Among his claims, he argued
that his communications and expressions relating to the memorandum
qualified for First Amendment protection.' 6 The district court granted
summary judgment against Cebalios, stating that the memorandum did
not represent protected speech, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the memorandum did in fact contain
protected speech. 7
B. Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, concluding that
Ceballos made the expressions pursuant to carrying out his official duties
and, therefore, his expressions did not constitute protected speech for
purposes of the First Amendment.' Justice Kennedy's majority opinion,
relying on Pickeringv. Boardof Education9 as the starting point for analysis,
noted that public employees do not automatically surrender all their
First Amendment rights.2 0 The opinion discussed how Pickering and its
progeny had developed two inquiries courts must follow in evaluating
the constitutional speech claims of public employees.2 ' First, courts must
determine if the employee spoke as a private citizen on a matter of public
concern.22 If he or she is not addressing a matter of public concern, "the
employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her

ii Id.
I2

Id.

13 Id.
14 Id. at414-15.

15 Id. at 415.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 421-22.
19 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In the case, the Supreme Court held
that a teacher could not be disciplined for writing a letter to a local newspaper complaining
about financial policies of the school board that employed him. Id. at 574-75.
2o Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417.
21

Id. at 48.

22 Id.
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employer's reaction to the speech."2 3 If speaking on a matter of public
concern, the employee may or may not enjoy First Amendment protection,
depending on "whether the relevant government entity had an adequate
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member
2 4
of the general public." 1
The majority opinion stated that allowing restrictions on the speech
of public employees stemmed from the need for government employers
to exert significant control over their employees' actions and to ensure
efficiency in providing services.2 " For this proposition, the opinion looked
to support from Connick v. Myers,16 which stated that governmental entities
and offices could not function properly "if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter." 7 Justice Kennedy also added that public
employees often occupy positions of trust and that their speaking out can
interfere with the implementation or carrying out of governmental policies
28
or functions or both.
Turning to Ceballos's claims, Justice Kennedy first noted that Ceballos
was not automatically denied protection for making his expressions at work
as opposed to making them publicly.2 9 The opinion pointed out that many
public employees engage in speech in the workplace, and simply excluding
speech on a workplace/non-workplace distinction did not comport with
the goal of treating public employees as private citizens.3" Instead, the
"controlling factor" for the majority was that Ceballos made his expressions
pursuant to carrying out his duties as a deputy district attorney.31 According
to the opinion, the Court held "that when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communication from employer discipline."3

24

Id.
Id.

25

Id.

23

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). In Connick, the Supreme Court held that
an assistant district attorney did not possess First Amendment protection for distributing a
questionnaire seeking the opinion of other assistant district attorneys regarding their views on
office policies and practices. Id. at 154.
27 Id. at 143.
28 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419. The majority acknowledged the "considerable significance"
of "leixposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct," but noted a "powerful network
of legislative enactments" such as whistle-blower laws and labor codes that protect public
employees "seek[ing] to expose wrongdoing." Id. at 425. The opinion stated that additional
constitutional provisions other than the First Amendment or criminal and civil laws also might
serve as safeguards to prevent or address official wrongdoing. Id. at 425-26.
29 Id. at 420.
30 Id.at 420-2 1.
31 Id. at 421.
32 Id.
26
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Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy mentioned two topics that were
not fully addressed in the decision. First, the opinion refused to put forth
any "comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee's
duties in cases where there is room for serious debate."33 But, the majority
warned that public employers could not impermissibly restrict employees'
First Amendment rights with "excessively broad job descriptions."' M
Second, the majority opinion merely touched on Justice Souter's concern
regarding the application of the Garcettistandards to higher education and
the potential threat to academic freedom.35 On this point Justice Kennedy
wrote, "[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's employee-speech
doctrine."3 6 He stated, however, that this issue was not before the Court in
the present case.37
C. DissentingOpinions
The three dissenting opinions in Garcetti all depicted the majority's
approach as doctrinaire, because it failed to permit constitutional
protections even in exceptional circumstances for communications made
by public employees in performing their job duties.38 Justices Stevens
and Souter both looked to the values at stake in the Court's decision in
39
Givhan v. Western Line ConsolidatedSchool District
in arguing against the
4°
bright-line rule announced by the majority. Givhan involved complaints
by a teacher to a principal concerning racial discrimination in a school's
hiring practices. 41 Though the speech was not made to the general public,
as in Pickering, the Court determined that Givhan's speech merited First
Amendment protection. 41 In commenting on Givhan's relevance to
Ceballos's claims, Justice Stevens stated, "[olur silence as to whether or
not her speech was made pursuant to her job duties demonstrates that
33 Id. at 424.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 425.

36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that only "'[slometimes,"' but not
"'[nlever,"' should the First Amendment protect speech by employees made pursuant to the
employee's official duties); id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that "addressing official
wrongdoing and threats to health and safety" can trump the interests of public employers);
id.at 446 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that at times the "special demand for constitutional
protection of the speech at issue" may override the interests of government as employer).
39 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 4I0 (1979).
40 Garcetti,547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 429 (Souter, J., dissenting).
41 Givhan,439 U.S. at 4I3.
42 Id. at 413-14.
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the point was immaterial. That is equally true today, for it is senseless to
let constitutional protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether
they fall within a job description." 43 Justice Stevens also criticized the
majority's rule on the grounds that it discouraged employees from taking
their concerns to superiors because of the fear of retaliation.'
Also looking to Givhan, Justice Souter discussed, that the majority's
holding meant that while the teacher in that case would still have received
constitutional protection, the school's personnel officer would not, a
distinction he described as odd.4" Justice Souter argued that the majority
offered no reasonable rationale for its outright rejection of the possibility of
any First Amendment protection for the expressions of public employees
in carrying out their official duties. 46 Instead, he contended that a modified
Pickeringanalysis provided a better approach to evaluate First Amendment
claims made by public employees in performing their duties. 4 1 The opinion
stated that while governmental employers possessed a strong interest
related to employee speech made in the course of employment, "addressing
official wrongdoing and threats to health and safety can outweigh the
government's stake in the efficient implementation of policy." 48 In addition
to the "value to an individual of speaking on public matters," 49 Justice
Souter argued that a more important reason for providing constitutional
protection in certain instances for communications made in carrying out
employment duties dealt with the "value to the public of receiving the
opinions and information that a public employee may disclose." 0 Justice
Souter also warned that employers, contrary to the admonishment in the
majority opinion, would in fact respond to the decision by creating broad
job descriptions. Turning again to the facts from the Givhan case, he wrote
as follows:
Now that the government can freely penalize the school personnel officer
for criticizing the principal because speech on the subject falls within the
personnel officer's job responsibilities, the government may well try to limit
the English teacher's options by the simple expedient of defining teachers'
job responsibilities expansively, investing them with a general obligation to
ensure sound administration of the school."'

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
5°
51

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 427.
Id. at. 430 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 428.
Id.
Id. at 429.
dissenting).
Id. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J.,
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A key critique offered by Justice Souter centered on the fact that the
standard announced by the majority always equated communications made
by a public employee in the course of carrying out his or her job duties to
"the government's own speech.""2 He argued that the majority failed to
acknowledge that "not everyone working for the government ... is hired
to speak from a government manifesto."53 For this point he relied on Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez,-' a case in which the Supreme Court invalidated
a provision that limited arguments legal services attorneys could make
on behalf of clients. 5 Justice Souter, criticizing what he viewed as the
sweeping nature of the opinion, stated that the majority's rule appeared
"spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public university
professor, and [he had] to hope that [the] majority [did] not mean to imperil
First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and
universities."5 6 As noted earlier, the majority acknowledged this concern as
potentially implicating other constitutional considerations but stated that
such a situation was not before the Court in the current case.57
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion argued that while the majority's
standard excluded speech even in exceptional circumstances, 58 Justice
Souter's approach would not sufficiently screen out cases in which courts
should not engage in a Pickeringanalysis 9 Instead, Justice Breyer contended
that "[w]here professional and special constitutional obligations are both
present, the need to protect the employee's speech is augmented."'
Under the facts presented in Garcetti, he felt that such a situation existed
because attorneys have a professional duty to speak out on certain issues
and that prosecutors bear a constitutional duty to provide certain evidence
to the defense.61 As another example, Justice Breyer discussed how a
prison doctor might bear a similar constitutional duty to communicate
dangerous conditions for prisoners. 6 Though advocating a less permissive
standard than that preferred by Justice Souter, the opinion still argued for
a constitutional safety valve that would provide public employees First
Amendment protection in exceptional circumstances for communications
made while performing their job duties.

52

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
6z

Id. at 436.
Id. at 437.
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2oo1).
Id. at 536-37.
Garcetti,U.S. at 438.
Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
Id. at 446 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447.
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POST-GARCETTi DECISIONS AND ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY

PUBLIC EDUCATION EMPLOYEES

Employees at public elementary and secondary schools have already
begun feeling the impact of the Garcettidecision. First Amendment claims
by administrators and other non-teacher employees are now subject to an
evaluation of whether or not the communications took place in the course
of carrying out employment duties. The extent to which Garcetti should
apply to the in-class speech of teachers remains uncertain, but at least one
court has applied the opinion to this type of communication.
A. Administrators
Courts have not hesitated to apply the standards of Garcetti to First
Amendment claims by school administrators and other staff. In these cases,
a key issue was what constitutes the scope of employment for purposes
of applying Garcetti. In Williams v. DallasIndependent School District,63 for
instance, the Fifth Circuit determined that the scope of employment
4
includes more than just officially assigned duties.M
The case dealt with
claims by Williams, a former head football coach and athletic director, who
alleged that his removal from both positions and the non-renewal of his
teaching contract stemmed from communications he made in memoranda
questioning the handling of athletic funds at the high school where he
6
worked.
The district court held that Williams's communications dealt with
internal employment matters rather than issues of public concern and
therefore received no First Amendment protection. 66 In a per curium
opinion, the circuit court again held for the school district, but on the basis
of the Garcettidecision. 67 According to that opinion, Williams was speaking
in the course of carrying out his official job duties and was not protected
by the First Amendment. 68 The opinion stated, "[e]ven if the speech is of
great social importance, it is not protected by the FirstAmendment so long
as it was made pursuant to the worker's official duties." 69
Noting that Garcetti did not define when an employee speaks pursuant
to his or her official duties, the court analyzed whether Williams's
63 Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 E3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007).
64 Id. at 693-94.
65 Id. at 69o-91. The school's office manager and principal were eventually placed on
administrative leave pending an investigation of their handling of the athletic funds. Id. at
691.
66 Id. at 691.

67 Id. at 692-94.
68 Id. at 694.
69 Id.at 692 (emphasis in original).
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memoranda constituted part of his duties.7" The opinion discussed how
the school district conceded that athletic directors and coaches were not
required to submit memoranda concerning athletic accounts.7 Considering
Givhan, Connick, Pickeringand lower federal court decisions decided since
Garcetti, the circuit court stated that "[a]ctivities undertaken in the course
of performing one's job are activities pursuant to official duties."7 " The
court characterized Williams's seeking information about athletic funds as
necessary for carrying out his duties as athletic director, such as paying for
tournament fees and purchasing athletic equipment.73 Thus, though the
memoranda were not required as part of Williams's employment tasks, the
court determined that he wrote them as part of carrying out his employment
duties as athletic director.7 4
Similar to the Williams decision, a Florida case in the Eleventh
Circuit rejected claims by a high school principal, D'Angelo, that he was
impermissibly dismissed from his position in part because he advocated the
conversion of his school to charter status.7 5 The court rejected arguments
that in his efforts to convert the high school, D'Angelo spoke at least in part
76
as a private citizen because of a general concern for the school's status.
The opinion stated that, like the attorney in Garcetti, the principal spoke as
part of his official duties, thus ending the inquiry as to whether D'Angelo
was acting within the scope of his duties as a public employee.77
While speech made pursuant to fulfilling employment duties may
encompass more than specifically mandated job duties, courts have placed
limits on what constitutes speech made within the course of carrying out
employment duties, even if involving school-related issues. In Casey v.
78
a school superintendent sued
West Las Vegas Independent School District,
following her non-renewal and alleged that the school board retaliated
against her for raising numerous irregularities regarding certain activities,

70 Id. at 692-94.

71

Id. at 693.

72 Id.

73 Id. at 694.

74 Id.
75 D'Angelo v. Sch. Bd., 497 F3d 1203 (1Ith Cir. 2o7).
76 Id.at 1z1o.
77 Id. at 1211. The principal also admitted that he undertook the speech as part of his
employment obligations related to maintaining and improving the school environment. For
another case discussing a principal's employment duties, see Cavazos v.Edgewood Independent
School District, 21o Fed. App'x. 414 (5th Cit. 2oo6) (per curiam), a case in which a principal
claimed that she was assigned to another school for pursuing disciplinary action against a
student who was the son of a member of the school board. Id. at 415. With very brief analysis,
the Fifth Circuit looked to Garceiii to hold that the principal's disciplining the student and
reporting the actions to school officials "clearly" fell within the principal's official duties. Id.
78 Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F3d 1323 (ioth Cir. 2007).
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including discrepancies with the district's Head Start program and the
state's Open Meetings Act.7 9
As superintendent of schools, Casey was the executive director of
the district's Head Start, a program that faced the loss of funding at the
time of her appointment as superintendent." She implemented reforms
that satisfied a federal oversight panel so that the district could continue
to receive funding.8 As part of the ongoing oversight of the program,
Casey became concerned that as many as half of the families enrolled in
the program had incomes that made them ineligible to participate." She
relayed her concerns to board members, but was at various times instructed
to leave the issue alone.83 Casey believed, however, that as the program's
executive director she had a duty to make sure the issue was reported to
federal officials. 84 Eventually, the school district was forced to refund more
8
than half a million dollars to the federal government.
Besides the Head Start irregularities, Casey also informed the board
that she believed it was violating the state's Open Meetings Act.86 The
board did not heed the warnings, and Casey reported the issue to the state's
Attorney General, who concluded that the board had violated state law and
ordered corrective measures. 87 Casey also warned the board that it was
in violation of numerous other federal and state laws.8 8 The school board
first demoted Casey from superintendent to assistant superintendent and
then declined to renew her contract for continuing employment with the
school district.8 9 She claimed that the dismissal infringed on protected
First Amendment rights. 9°
In evaluating the former superintendent's claims, the court considered
the communications made regarding the Head Start program and the Open
Meetings Act. 9' In evaluating the communications regarding the Head
Start program, the court considered the significance of communications

79 Id. at 1326-27.
80 Id.at 1325-26.
81 Id. at 1326.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1327.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1329. Between the hearing of the case by the District Court and the Circuit
Court, the Garcetti decision was issued. The superintendent conceded that some matters,
such as communications regarding hiring practices, were not protected communications based
on Garcetti. Id. at 1325.
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9
made directly to the school board members and to federal authorities.
In relation to the communications to school board members regarding
Head Start, the court stated that the superintendent acted within her
duty of advising the district how to maintain compliance with federal laws
and policies. 93 Consequently, the court held that these communications
94
occurred in the course of Casey performing her employment duties.
Considering the issue separately, the court also held that the
communications to federal officials took place while Casey exercised her
employment duties. 95 The court discussed and Casey conceded that
her position as executive director required her to report programmatic
irregularities or face legal responsibility. 96 While acknowledging that the
information was of public importance, the court focused on the legal duty of
the executive officer.97 The court concluded that Casey's communications
were "more akin to that of a senior executive acting pursuant to official
duties than to that of an ordinary citizen speaking on his or her own time;
accordingly, Ms. Casey cannot meet her burden here and avoid the heavy
barrier erected by the Supreme Court in Garcetti to the satisfaction of
Pickering's first prong."9
The court determined, however, that the superintendent's comments to
the state's Attorney General regarding the Open Meetings Act fell outside
9
the scope of Casey's employment duties. Rather than seeking to advise
the board, the superintendent made the complaint to the Attorney General
100
The court also explained
because she had lost confidence in the board.
Casey did not possess
program,
Start
Head
the
with
duties
that, unlike her
non-compliance
report
to
obligation
legal
or
any official employment
1
Casey's
Accordingly,
officials."'
state
to
Act
Meetings
Open
the
with
of
scope
the
outside
fell
General
Attorney
the
state's
to
communications
her employment duties.102
At least one court has taken the approach that, despite a seeming
connection with one's employment duties, an administrator could also
communicate as a private citizen on a matter of public concern. In Cioffi

92 Id. at 1329-30.
93 Id. at 1329.
94 Id
95 Id.at 1329-30.
96 Id.at 1330.
97 Id
98 Id.at 1331.
99 Id.at 1332. Communications made directly to the board concerning its meeting
practices did fall within the scope of carrying out employment duties. Id.
i oo Id.
ioi Id.
102

Id.
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v. Averill Park CentralSchool DistrictBoard of Education,13 a high school's
athletic director and director of physical education, Cioffi, sued claiming his
position was eliminated in response to his criticisms of the school's football
coach and hazing incidents involving football players."° As a result of the
elimination, Cioffi wrote a letter to the district's superintendent, critical of
the school's football coach's actions and the district's investigation of serious
hazing among football players.' After the school board moved to eliminate
the position of athletic director, Cioffi held a press conference stating that
he believed the board acted in retribution for his criticisms of the football
coach and the hazing.0 6 At the press conference, the athletic director stated
that his primary concern was the health and safety of the athletes, a point
he had made to school officials in his previous communications. 7
In analyzing Cioffi's First Amendment claims, the court noted the
pending decision in Garcetti. According to the opinion, the decision would
not affect the present case, however, because Cioffi was not speaking only
as an employee carrying out his official duties but also as a private citizen. °0
Although the contention was later rejected by the court, the school district
argued that in the letter he wrote and at the press conference he held,
Cioffi spoke regarding "personal matters" because his main concern was
keeping his job."° The court determined that he was also speaking as a
private citizen, noting that Cioffi described his main concern as the health
and safety of the students." 0 The Cioffi court allowed for the possibility
that one may act in the scope of one's employment but at the same time
undertake additional activities as a private citizen; such activates may bear
a connection to one's employment but not necessarily be a part of a person's
job activities.
It is interesting to contrast the outcome in Cioffi with the other cases
discussed. It seems a reasonable assumption that as athletic director
Cioffi's employment duties should include concern with the health and
safety of athletes. However, given the apparent cover-up of a serious
hazing incident in Cioffi, the court may have been reluctant to deny First
Amendment protection to an individual seeking to protect students. While

103 Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F3d 158 (zd Cir. zoo6), cert.

denied, 127 S. Ct. 382 (2oo6).
io4 Id. at 16o. The hazing was not of a minor nature. One student told Cioffi of an
incident in which he was pinned on the floor by other players who rubbed their genitals over
his face. Id. at 161.
105 Id. The hazing incidents eventually resulted in negative publicity and in the arrest
of multiple students and teachers after the hazing victim filed a criminal complaint. Id.
io6 Id.
107 Id.
io8 Id. at 167 n.3.
109 Id. at 165.
11o Id. at 167 n.3.

2008- 2009]

SILENCE AT THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE

the court held that the athletic director spoke as a private citizen in Cioffi, it
represents somewhat of a stretch to conclude that he was not acting within
the scope of employment in his communication with the school board.
The court seemed to include, in addition to the press conference, the
letter as a communication on a matter of public concern. While it is not too
difficult to view the press conference as being independent of the athletic
director's duties,"' the letter to district officials appears more in line with
the official duties of an athletic director. Furthermore, the majority opinion
in Garcetti made clear that private motivations do not remove an issue from
the scope of employment duties."' The district attorney in Garcetti, for
instance, likely may have been motivated by personal interest related to
ensuring fairness in a criminal prosecution, but this personal interest did
13
not determine whether an activity fell within the scope of employment.
The Cioffi decision indicates that in particularly troubling cases courts
may use the scope of authority analysis as an avenue to provide public
employees with some First Amendment rights. It also demonstrates
the folly of not providing, especially in exceptional cases, constitutional
protection to public education employees who communicate in good faith
to protect the health and safety of students but are denied First Amendment
protection simply based on the fact that the communication occurred within
the course of carrying out one's job duties. This standard causes even more
concern when claimants can demonstrate that their superiors did not take
action when informed of a problem.
As Justice Stevens warned, the Garcetti decision potentially creates an
incentive for employees to circumvent the chain of authority and to make
concerns publicly known to clarify that they are clearly acting as private
citizens,1 which could actually have an adverse impact on employment
relations. Perhaps even more likely is that employees will be more timid in
speaking out, especially when superiors fail to respond. This is a troubling
state of affairs since the public benefits from having public employees
expose wrongdoing, especially in egregious situations such as that in the
Cioffi case.
The Casey holding highlights another of the troubling aspects of the
Garcetti decision. Based on the facts considered by the court in Casey, the
superintendent was stuck between a school board that was unresponsive
to reported problems with the district's Head Start program and her legal
i i i The press conference can be viewed as somewhat analogous to the letter drafted by
the teacher in Pickering.
112 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421 (206).
113 Id. The Court stated that it was "immaterial whether... [Ceballos] experienced
some personal gratification from writing the memo; his First Amendment rights do not depend
on his job satisfaction." Id.
114 Id. at 427. Acting clearly as a private citizen outside the scope of one's employment
duties would of course create at least the potential for First Amendment protection.
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obligations under federal law to report certain issues to federal officials. A
duty to report under federal law served as a key element to deny Casey
First Amendment protection for the communications she made regarding
the Head Start program. Thus, even though Casey had alerted the board
to problems and it took no action, she was denied constitutional protections
for her communications because she was following the appropriate course
of action. The decision demonstrates how the bright-line rule announced
in Garcetti may fail to protect public employees acting to protect the public's
interests and to comply with federal and state laws.
Given the limits that Garcetti places on the First Amendment rights
of administrators and staff, states and school boards may want to consider
implementing strategies or polices that protect communications by
employees in certain instances, such as non-retaliation policies, anonymous
reporting mechanisms, or both. School districts should consider that a lack
of protections could mean that employees either may not come forward
with troubling information or may initially seek to bypass superiors when
communicating concerns due to a fear of retaliation.
B. Teachers
Just as with administrators, application of the Garcetti standards has
also arisen in relation to communications made by teachers. In Mayer v.
Monroe County Community Corp.,"' a probationary schoolteacher, Mayer,
filed suit after she was not renewed for a subsequent year and claimed
that her dismissal occurred because of personal political views offered in a
current-events lesson." 6 The district court granted summary judgment for
the school district and a panel for the Seventh Circuit affirmed." 7 Taking
Mayer's allegations as true for purposes of summary judgment review, the
panel considered if First Amendment protection attached to the teacher
saying, in response to a question about her personal involvement in political
demonstrations, that when passing a protest against the nation's military
actions in Iraq, she honked at a sign that read, "'Honk for Peace."' ' 8
Following complaints from some parents over the lesson, the principal
directed teachers not to take sides in politically controversial subjects." 9
Mayer claimed that the incident resulted in her dismissal.'2 0
The district court concluded that Mayer spoke on an issue of public
concern, which meant the possibility of First Amendment protection

115 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmrty. Corp., 474 F3d 477 (7th Cir.2007).
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existed."2 ' Using a Pickering balancing approach, the court determined,
however, that Mayer's speech interests were secondary to that of her
On appeal, Mayer contended that the court erred in its
employer.'
application of the Pickeringfactors,'3 and she raised the issue that "principles
of academic freedom" prohibited applying the Garcetti standards to the
classroom. 2 4 The school board countered that Mayer's speech enjoyed no
First Amendment protection since it occurred pursuant to carrying out her
official duties.'
Writing for the panel, Judge Easterbrook's opinion rejected Mayer's
claims.'2 6 He noted previous Seventh Circuit cases articulating that
"public-school teachers must hew to the approach prescribed by principals
(and others higher up in the chain of authority)."'2 7 Judge Easterbrook
stated that teachers should be viewed as conduits of approved speech in
the classroom:
[T]he school system does not "regulate" teachers' speech as much as it hires
that speech. Expression is a teacher's stock in trade, the commodity she
sells to her employer in exchange for a salary. A teacher hired to lead a
social-studies class can't use it as a platform for a revisionist perspective
that Benedict Arnold wasn't really a traitor, when the approved program
calls him one; a high-school teacher hired to explicate Moby-Dick in a
literature class can't use Cry, The Beloved Country instead, even if Paton's
book better suits the instructor's style and point of view; a math teacher
can't decide that calculus is more important than trigonometry and decide
to let Hipparchus and Ptolemy slide in favor of Newton and Leibniz.2 8
The opinion described the case presented as easier than Garcettibecause of
this conception of teachers as essentially hiring out their speech in exchange
for pay.'2 9 While the court acknowledged that it was an open question
how much Garcetti might apply to scholarly activities in higher education,
the court did not consider any sort of academic freedom rights that might3
exist for elementary and secondary teachers, even in a restricted form. 0
The captive nature of the classroom was also used to bolster the court's
position that school officials should be able to control and limit completely
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the speech of teachers in the classroom. 3' According to the opinion, the
compulsory nature of public education made elected officials the preferred
arbiters of content in the classroom rather than making students subject to
their "teachers' idiosyncratic perspectives."
The federal district court in Panse v. Eastwood3 followed a similar
approach to that taken in Mayer regarding scope of employment. In Panse,
the court considered, based on the teacher's version of facts, whether any
protection should be afforded to statements regarding the importance of
having a portfolio of nude sketches when competing for art scholarships
and the art teacher's thoughts of perhaps starting a school where students
who obtained parental consent could produce such sketches.'33 Looking to
Garcetti,the opinion stated that the teacher made the comments in connection
with carrying out his official duties and, thus, the communications did not
qualify for First Amendment protection.' 34 Discussing the definition of
employment duties, the court stated that "[t]he official duties of high school
teachers certainly encompass not only the formal lessons of the subject
curriculum, but also include, at a minimum, broader classroom discussions
about the assigned subject, as well as topics such as whether and how to
pursue future educational opportunities in that subject area."' 35
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit's approach in Mayer, the Third
Circuit has not applied Garcetti to the classroom speech of teachers,
though its standard also denies First Amendment protections to numerous
communications by teachers and similarly situated individuals such as
coaches. In Borden v. School District,' 6 a head football coach asserted the
right "to engage in the silent acts of bowing his head during the team's
pre-meal grace and taking a knee with his team during a locker-room
prayer."' 37 The coach had taken these actions after he was disallowed from
leading his players in prayer.'38 Among his claims, the football coach argued
that not letting him engage in these expressive acts implicated several
constitutional rights, including his free speech rights and those rights
grounded in academic freedom.'39

131 Id.
132 Panse v. Eastwood, No. o6 Civ. 6697 (SCR), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55o8o (S.D.N.Y.
July 20, 2007).
133 Id. at *3-4.
134 Id. at* 2-13.
135 Id. at *12 (citing Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F3d 477, 478-79
(7th Cir. 2007)).

136 Borden v. Sch. Dist., 523 F3d 153 (3d Cir. 2oo8).
137 Id. at 158.
138 Id. at 159-6o. Previously, the coach received instructions to refrain from engaging in
several prayer activities with the football team, including leading prayers. Id.
139 Id. at 168.
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As part of its analysis, the court applied the Pickering-Connick standard
to the coach's speech, determining that the acts did not relate to a matter
of public concern.'" At one point, the court stated that uncertainty existed
regarding the application of the Garcetti standards in an "educational
context," but if applied the coach would be deemed to have acted pursuant
to fulfilling his official duties. 41 The court held that the coach's assertions
that his actions sought to promote unity while increasing team moral and
showing respect for the players' prayers were "personal to Borden and his
team and are not matters of public concern." 141
Regarding the coach's academic freedom claims, the opinion analyzed
whether the expressive acts qualified as "in-class conduct," which circuit
decisions had held were unprotected by the First Amendment. 143 The court
stated that "to determine if the teacher's conduct is considered in-class
conduct we must determine whether the teacher is engaging in one of the
'four essential freedoms' that constitute academic freedom."' 44 If engaged
14
in one of these areas, the teacher's in-class conduct is not protected. 1
Previous decisions had concluded that choice of teaching methods, use
of particular classroom management techniques, and grade assignment
all constituted in-class conduct.'" The court noted that with the coach's
pedagogic reasoning for his expressive conduct, "he is acting as a proxy
for the School District, and the School District may choose both how its
' 47
students are taught and what its students are taught."'
The court in Caruso v. Massapequa Union Free School Distric 4 s also did
not automatically assume that Garcettiapplies to all speech by teachers.' 49 In
Caruso, a probationary teacher claimed constructive discharge based on her
open support of George Bush for president, including making comments
to students and having a picture of Bush in her classroom. 0 According
to the plaintiff's version of the facts, which the court assumed as true for
purposes of the decision, the principal stated that she would not receive

Id. at 168-69.
141 Id. at 171 n.13.
140

Id. at 169.
143 ld.at 172.
142

144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Caruso v. Massapequa Union Free Sch. Dist., 478 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y 2007).
149 Id.at 382-83.
150 Id. at 38o-8I. The school district's version of events stated that the teacher was
instructed to either remove the photograph or include a picture of John Kerry. Id. The district
stated that it directed the teacher to do so because a mock election for students was pending
and the school district did not want to impart the impression that one candidate was favored
over another. Id.
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tenure and advised her to resign before an unfavorable promotion decision
took place.''
The court refused to grant summary judgment while noting that the
determination of scope of employment duties does not always represent
an easy task.' Carusoalso mentioned that the Garcetti majority stated that
other constitutional provisions might limit applying Garcetti to classroom
communication or to scholarship.5 3 Carusomade clear that the determination
of specific factual issues required resolution before determining whether or
not the plaintiff made her comments in the context of carrying out her
official duties.' 4 Unlike in Mayer, the Caruso court was open to the concept
that elementary and secondary teachers may enjoy some First Amendment
right to academic freedom and that Garcettimay be limited in its application
to teachers.
The approach taken by the Caruso court recognizes a more cautious
approach than that taken in Mayer concerning whether Garcetti should
apply to in-class speech by teachers. While school officials may
extensively regulate the speech of teachers, the court in Caruso raises the
point that teachers may not be denied all First Amendment protection for
in-class speech.'
In contrast, the Mayer court interpreted the teacher's
communications as covered by the standards announced in Garceti.5 6 Use
of this standard meant that school officials could discipline the teacher for
violating a prohibition on in-class political speech even when enactment
of the district-wide rule occurred after the teacher had already made her
comments. 7 In denying any First Amendment protection for in-class
speech, theMayeropinionstated that teachers do not possess an independent
right to impose personal curriculum choices on students;' but, based on
the facts as considered by the court, the teacher did not disregard school
policy, and her contract was not renewed only after her answer to a student
question drew complaints from some parents.
TheMayerdecisionshows that applying Garcettitoin-class speech means
that teachers may not enjoy even minimal First Amendment protection
for communications made in the classroom, including the right to receive
adequate notice that a category of speech is prohibited. However, the
differing approaches in the cases discussed in this section demonstrate that
it remains unsettled whether Garcetti should apply to the in-class speech of
teachers. One potential basis for First Amendment protection for in-class
151 Id. at 38o-84.
152

153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 382-84.
Id. at 383 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,425 (2006)).
Caruso v. Massapequa Union Free Sch. Dist., 478 E Supp. 2d at 384.
Id. at 383-84.
Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 E3d 477,480 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 478-80.
Id. at 479-80.
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speech by teachers is judicial recognition of modest rights for teachers
under concepts related to academic freedom.
Despite this potential basis of First Amendment protection, even a very
restricted form of academic freedom for elementary and secondary teachers
faces significant legal hurdles. Notably, in addition to the reluctance by
several courts to accept the applicability of academic freedom to elementary
and secondary teachers, academic freedom for faculty members in higher
education currently rests in a constitutional bog. Consideration of any
right of academic freedom for elementary and secondary teachers, even
in a limited form, benefits from an understanding of the ambiguous legal
status of individual academic freedom in higher education. Resolution of
the issue of constitutional protection for individual academic freedom for
college and university faculty members may ultimately impact whether
or not elementary and secondary teachers possess a somewhat analogous,
though more restricted, protection for their in-class speech. Accordingly,
Part III generally considers individual academic freedom, with an emphasis
on higher education, before focusing in Part IV on the in-class speech of
elementary and secondary teachers and. any First Amendment protections
that might exist.
III.

INDIVIDUAL AcADEMIc FREEDOM

Individual academic freedom represents a much discussed and heavily
contested legal doctrine, even in higher education. This section outlines
some of the ongoing issues regarding recognition of academic freedom by
the Supreme Court, where much discussion and dispute has centered on
college and university professors. While often considered a cornerstone
of higher education, constitutional protection for the academic freedom
of individual professors has engendered significant debate.'5 9 At least one
federal court has taken the position that if academic freedom exists as a
distinct constitutional concept at all, then the constitutional protections
exist for the institution rather than for the individual scholar. 16°

159 See generally, J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989); Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom or
Autonomy Grounded upon the First Amendment: A JurisprudentialMirage, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 1
(2007); Frederick Schauer, What NextforAcademic Freedom? Is there a Right to Academic Freedom?
77 U. COLo. L. REV. 907 (zoo6); R. George Wright, The Emergence of FirstAmendment Academic
Freedom, 85 NEB. L. REV. 793 (2007).
160 Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F3d 401,412 (4th Cir. 2000).
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A. Academic Freedom as a ConstitutionalConcern of the Supreme Court
Academic freedom first received attention by the Supreme Court in a
dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas in Adlerv. BoardofEducation."I The
case dealt with the validity of a state law that, among its proscribed activities,
prohibited employment of any individual identified as a member of an
62
organization designated as subversive in a public education institution.
The majority held that the state had a legitimate interest in excluding from
school employment those individuals who supported or were members of
63
organizations that supported the unlawful overthrow of the government.1
But, Justice Douglas's dissent argued, "The Constitution guarantees
freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society. All are
entitled to it; and none needs it more than the teacher." 164 Describing the
public school as the "cradle of our democracy," 16 Justice Douglas argued
that the law threatened to "raise havoc with academic freedom" by turning
schools into places of distrust and spying instead of an arena for the open
exchange of ideas.' 66
In the same year that Adler was decided, the Supreme Court refused to
uphold an Oklahoma law requiring state employees to take loyalty oaths
that they had not belonged to organizations designated communist or
subversive in the previous five years.' 67 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
construed the act to include individuals who had been unaware that
a group to which they belonged sought to promote illegal or subversive
goals. 61 In reviewing the decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it
was impermissible to punish individuals who had unknowingly belonged
to an organization with subversive aims. 69 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Frankfurter, much as Justice Douglas had done in his dissent in Adler,
discussed the importance of protecting the First Amendment rights of
educators at all levels:
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the primary
grades to the university-as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to
indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits
of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible
citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public
161 Alder v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 509-10(I952).
162 Id.at 489-90. The law was known as the Feinberg Law. Id.at 487.

163 Id.
at 493-96.
164 Id.
at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
165 Id.

166 Id. at 5o9-io.
167 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
168 Id. at 189-9o.
169 Id. at i9o-9i.

(1952).
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opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice, by
the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of
open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble
task if the conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are
denied to them. They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by
thought and action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the
checkered history of social and economic dogma. They must be free to sift
evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from that restless,
enduring process of extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to
assure which the freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States against infraction by
national or State government.
The functions of educational institutions in our national life and the
conditions under which alone they can adequately perform them are at the
basis of these limitations upon State and national power. 170
The decision in Sweezy v. New Hampshire7' represented another
significant moment for the development of academic freedom as a
constitutional concern. Sweezy dealt with an individual refusing to answer
questions from the New Hampshire Attorney General's office relating
to lectures given by him at a state university.7 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Frankfurter stated that protecting inquiry at universities is of vital
importance to the nation's interest and that governmental intrusion into
the affairs of colleges and universities should be minimized. 7 3 According
to Justice Frankfurter, to allow unfettered inquiry, "[p]olitical power must
abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest
of wise government and the people's well-being, except for reasons that
are exigent and obviously compelling."' 7 4 Quoting from a statement by
scholars in South Africa, the opinion defined the four essential freedoms of
the university as the freedom of a university to decide "who may teach, what
may be taught," the method of teaching, and who shall be admitted. 7 '
With the decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 7 6 constitutional
protection for academic freedom became incorporated into a majority
opinion. In the decision, the Supreme Court once again dealt with the
New York law addressing membership in subversive organizations that it

170 Id.at196-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
171 Sweezy v.N.H., 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
172 Id. at 243.
173 Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

174 Id. at 262.
175 Id. at 262-63.
176 Keyishian v.Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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had considered in Adler. 7' A majority of the Court invalidated the standards
that it had previously approved in Adler requiring employees to submit
statements that they did not belong to subversive organizations such as the
Communist Party. 178 The majority opinion stated that inAdlerthe Court had
not considered if the reporting requirements proved impermissibly vague
and that "pertinent constitutional doctrines have since [Adler] rejected the
premises" relied upon by the majority in that case. 7 9 While acknowledging
the state's interest in preventing "subversion" in students based on the
activities of teachers and professors, the opinion discussed the importance
of protecting constitutional rights of free speech, press and assembly, which
also included protecting the right of educators to engage in unfettered
intellectual inquiry. 80 In a well-known passage, the majority stated, "Our
nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom therefore is a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."''
The opinion, turning to Sweezy for support, emphasized that academic
freedom served to protect open debate and discourse in society.'
The Supreme Court has periodically continued to sound the connection
between academic freedom and the First Amendment. In Grutter v.
Bollinger,'83 for example, the Court relied in part on principles of academic
freedom to permit the use of race as one factor in higher education
admissions. 114 Yet, the legal landscape regarding constitutional protection
for academic freedom remains far from clear, especially in relation to
First Amendment protections for individual scholars versus those vested
in institutions. Courts and legal commentators have expressed differing
stances regarding the degree to which the First Amendment protects
academic freedom at the individual level. 185 The cases discussed below
demonstrate that courts disagree considerably over constitutional protection
for individual academic freedom, even when dealing with college and
university professors.
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Id. at 593.
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Id. at 595.
Id. at 6o2-o3.
Id. at 603.
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Id. at 334-35.
See supranote 159.
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B. Lower FederalCourts andIndividualAcademic Freedom
Debate over individual academic freedom in higher education extends
so far that at least one federal circuit court has concluded that academic
freedom, if a recognized constitutional doctrine at all, exists only at the
institutional level. In Urofsky v. Gilmore,'86 the Fourth Circuit held that
faculty members at public colleges and universities enjoy no other First
Amendment protections than those available to other public employees.187
Sitting en banc, the court considered, among other issues, whether a state
law that prohibited state employees from accessing sexually explicit material
on computers owned or leased by the state violated the First Amendment
rights of professors employed at public universities. 88 The professors
argued that the law prohibited them from engaging in legitimate research
activities protected by academic freedom under the First Amendment.189
Foreshadowing the decision in Garcetti, the court stated that since
the speech at issue took place in relation to employees "carrying out
employment duties," the law did not regulate the speech of the employees
as private citizens, thus removing the need for any sort of Pickering-Connick
analysis."9 According to the court's opinion, the state sought to regulate
speech by employees in relation to carrying out their job duties as opposed
to their speech made as private citizens.' 9' Turning to whether any sort
of constitutional protection for individual academic freedom shielded the
professors, the majority described academic freedom as an ambiguous
concept applied unevenly by courts. The court stated, "[olur review of the
law.., leads us to conclude that to the extent the Constitution recognizes
any right of 'academic freedom' above and beyond the First Amendment
rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University,
not in individual professors .... ."g According to the opinion, "[t]he
Supreme Court, to the extent it has constitutionalized a right of academic
freedom at all, appears to have recognized only an institutional right of
self-governance in academic affairs." 193
Other courts have cited Urofsky approvingly 1 or followed a similar
approach to evaluate individual academic freedom claims. For example,
t86 Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F3d 401 (4th Cir.
187 Id. at 415.
188 Id. at 404.
189 Id.at 405-06.
190 Id. at 409.
191 Id.
192

2000).

Id.at 410.

193 Id.at 412.
194 See, e.g., Johnshon-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2oo5) (holding that
university officials could direct an adjunct professor to provide more detailed information
regarding the steps required to satisfy course requirements to students who had received the
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the Third Circuit has taken a negative view of First Amendment rights of
public college and university professors, at least in relation to classroom
activities. In Brown v. Armenti 95the court stated that it had held in Edwards
v. CaliforniaUniversity ofPennsylvania'96that "in the classroom, the university
was the speaker and the professor was the agent of the University for First
Amendment purposes."197 Relying on Edwards,the court determined that
grading fell under the institution's right to determine how a course is taught
and did not implicate any First Amendment rights of the professor. 9
The approach taken by courts in such cases as Urofsky and Brown has
certainly not been accepted by all courts. Piarowski v. PrarieState College
involved the placement of an exhibition of a professor's artwork that was
sexual in nature. 199In that case, Judge Posner's opinion for the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged the "equivocal" nature of academic freedom: "It is
used to denote both the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without
interference from the government .. . and the freedom of the individual
teacher.., to pursue his ends without interference from the academy...
2,00The court, though permitting the relocation of a sexually explicit art
exhibit by institutional officials, stated that the university and the professor
both possessed interests in the location of the display.2 0'
In direct contrast to the Brown decision generally, and its treatment of
02
grades specifically, the Sixth Circuit in Paratev.Isibor2
held that a professor
did communicate for First Amendment purposes in assigning a grade.203
Looking to Judge Posner's opinion in Piarowski, the court discussed that
both the university and a professor may raise academic freedom concerns
under the First Amendment.0 4 The court described a grade assignment as
a form of symbolic speech.205 Describing the professor's role in assigning
2 6
grades as involving the "professional judgment" of the faculty member, 0
the court in Paratehit a much different chord than that heard in Brown,

grade of incomplete); Martinez v. Univ. of PR., No. o6-1713 (JAF), 2oo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92925, at *io(D.PR. Dec. zo, zoo6) (citing Urofsky in denying claims of a contract professor
who challenged the decisions and authority of university officials related to his employment
conditions and assigned duties).
195 Brown v. Armenti, 247 E3d 69 (3d Cir. 2oo).
196 Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa.,156 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 1998).
197 Brown, 247 F3d at 74.
198 Id. at 75.
i99 Piarowski v. Prarie State Coll., 759 Ezd 625,626-29 (7th Cir. 1985).
2oo Id. at 629.
201 Id. at 629-3o.
202 Parate v. Isibor, 868 F2d
203 Id. at 827.
204 Id. at 826-27.
205 Id. at 827.
2o6 Id. at 828.

821

(6th Cir. 1989).
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which described professors as not speaking for First Amendment purposes
20 7
in the classroom.
Silva v. University of New Hampshireprovides another example of a court
refusing to give unfettered discretion to university officials regarding control
over the classroom. 08 In Silva, the court held that a tenured professor who
consistently used sexual analogies to teach technical writing and engaged in
other behavior and communications deemed to violate the school's sexual
harassment policy was impermissibly disciplined by the school.2 0, While
"recognizing that 'academic freedom [is not] a license for uncontrolled
expression at variance with established curricular contents and internally
destructive of the proper functioning of the institution,' '2 1 0 the court held
that the school's sexual harassment policy as applied to the professor's inclass speech violated principles of academic freedom."' The court also
rejected the university's arguments that the professor did not speak on
matters of public concern, stating that "tilt is a fundamental tenet of First
Amendment jurisprudence that the preservation of academic freedom is a
matter of public concern." ' The court defined "public concern" not just
to focus on the specific content of the professor's comments, but on the
general importance of protecting speech by professors."1 3
These cases illustrate the legal uncertainty regarding constitutional
protection of individual academic freedom in public higher education,
suggesting a high legal burden for establishing any degree of First
Amendment rights for elementary and secondary teachers. If the Urofsky
approach prevails, 14 then speech by faculty members at public colleges
and universities would fall under the standards announced in Garcetti.
Ultimate determination of the rights of faculty members at public colleges
and universities may play some role in influencing whether or not public
school elementary and secondary teachers also possess some form of First
Amendment protection. With the general discussion of individual academic
freedom providing context, the article now turns to how courts have treated
First Amendment claims by teachers.

Brown v.Armenti, 247 F3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 200).
zo8 Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
209 Id. at 314.
210 Id. (quoting Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.zd 928, 931 (7th Cir.
207

211

1972)).

Id.

212 Id.at315.

Id. at 3 15-16.
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F3d 401,412 (4th Cir. 2ooo). It is important to keep in mind,
however, that academic freedom at colleges and universities also rests strongly on professional
standards, including and especially the tenure system, to protect individual academic freedom.
For a discussion of academic freedom as a professional value in higher education, see Byrne,
213

214

supra note 159, at 272-88.
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IN-CLASS RELATED SPEECH OF ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY TEACHERS

It remains undetermined whether elementary and secondary public
school teachers are subject to the Garcetti standards for speech related
to curriculum or pedagogy or both."'9 As shown by the Mayer decision,
some lower federal courts stand poised to apply the Garcetti standards
to the communications of teachers. 216 Under this approach, teachers'
communications to students, especially occurring during class, would
appear to constitute a part of fulfilling employment duties. Even speech
made outside of class to students, such as in the hall between classes,
during the lunch period or perhaps even after school, would often appear to
encompass speech made pursuant to carrying out one's employment duties
as a teacher.
While Garcettimay ultimately prove the death knell for any meaningful
First Amendment rights for classroom related communications made by
teachers, recent years, with some exceptions, have already witnessed a
general judicial resistance to First Amendment rights for teachers! 7 Still,
courts have not uniformly agreed that teachers do not possess some kind
of First Amendment rights for in-class speech. In particular, certain courts
have demonstrated sympathy to the idea that teachers should receive
some form of notice that an area of speech has been prohibited by school
officials."' 5
Some courts have flatly refused to acknowledge that elementary
and secondary teachers enjoy any independent First Amendment rights
regarding issues related to classroom matters or any kind of individual
academic freedom. The Third Circuit, for example, considered a case
in which a teacher claimed a First Amendment right under principles of
19
academic freedom to use a particular classroom management system."
The
court stated that it did not have to define the scope of academic freedom

215 It is worth noting that some speech by teachers would not relate to in-class speech
and in these instances teachers would be subject to similar standards as administrators.
Courts would engage in an analysis of whether the teacher was speaking as a private citizen or
engaged in performing job duties. In these instances, teachers could be viewed as performing
job functions with administrative qualities, such as assisting with the front office, helping to
direct traffic, or working at school functions such as athletic events. In these cases, schools and
teachers may dispute what constitutes a teacher's employment duties outside the classroom.
The Givhan case provides an example of speech by a teacher speaking as a citizen to complain
about discriminatory hiring practices at the school and speech by a teacher that would still be
protected, even under the standards of Garcetti. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S.
410, 412-13 (1979).

216 See supraPart II-B.
217 See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
218 See Uerling, supra note 4, at 963.
219 Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 199o).
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but concluded that "no court has found that teachers' First Amendment
rights extend to choosing their own curriculum or classroom management
techniques in contravention of school policy or dictates." 2 0 The decision
went on to acknowledge, "Although a teacher's out-of-class conduct,
including her advocacy of particular teaching methods, is protected, her
in-class conduct is not." '' The Tenth Circuit followed a similar approach
in rejecting that comments made to students in a class by a teacher merited
First Amendment protection."' While noting that at least one federal
court had recognized a university professor's right to individual academic
freedom, the court stated that those cases did2 3not support the argument
that such a right exists for secondary teachers.
Not all courts, as pointed out in some of the cases discussed below,
have denied that teachers are without any First Amendment rights for
in-class related speech. Even if not casting First Amendment rights as
explicitly grounded in academic freedom, these courts have determined
that teachers enjoy at least minimal First Amendment protection for inclass speech. 2 4 Along with disagreement over whether teachers possess
some degree of First Amendment rights for classroom communications or
other closely related duties such as those involving coaching academic or
athletic teams, courts also have differed on the correct legal standards to
analyze speech claims by teachers. As the following sections discuss, a
fault line has developed among courts regarding whether or not Hazelwood
or Pickering-Connick standards should apply to speech by teachers related
to the classroom or made in working with students in closely related
capacities.
A. (Tinker)-Hazelwood versus Pickering-Connick
to Assess In-Class Speech
Courts have divided over whether to apply the standards derived from
Hazelwood(or Tinker-Hazelwood)or from the Pickering-Connickline of cases
to the in-class related speech of teachers.2 ' One circuit case identified the
First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits as using Hazelwood to

220

Id.

221
222

Id. (citations omitted).
Miles v. Denver Public Schs., 944 Ezd 773, 779 (ioth Cir. 1991).

223

Id.

As one commentator discusses, rather than the term academic freedom, it may be
more appropriate to use the term "academic expression" as a "useful denotation of teacher
expression that may enjoy some constitutional protection." Uerling, supranote 4, at 959 (citing
Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 771, 775 (E.D. Ky. 2ooo)).
225 Chiras v. Miller, 432 E3d 606,617 n.29 (5th Cir. 2005); Lee v. York County Sch. Div.,
418 F. Supp.2d 8 16, 82 1 (E.D. Va. 2006); Karen C. Daly, BalancingAct:Teachers' ClassroomSpeech
andthe FirstAmendment,3 o J.L. & EDUC. 1, 16-17 (2001).
224
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analyze claims involving "teacher's instructional speech,"1 6and categorized
the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits as using the Pickering-Connickline of
cases to evaluate speech by teachers. 2 7 The Ninth Circuit has also been
identified as holding that speech by teachers is that of the government and
does not receive First Amendment protection.2 8 The Third Circuit has
been characterized as using the Pickering-Connickline of cases2 9 as well as
an alternative standard based on the Supreme Court's decisions 30 in Rusty.
3
Sullivan-'3 and Rosenbergerv. University of Virginia.11
1. Hazelwood Standardsto EvaluateTeachers' In-ClassSpeech.-In Hazelwood
School Districtv. Kuhlmeier,133 the Supreme Court held that school officials
could place conditions on school-sponsored speech as "long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. ''z 3 The
case dealt with the authority of a school principal to censor articles in a
school-sponsored newspaper. 3s Though the case centered on student
speech, the majority stated that in the context of school-sponsored speech
these limitations could be applied to teachers and "other members of
the school community."' 36 The Court stated that public school facilities
"may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have 'by
policy or by practice' opened those facilities" for use as a forum. 37 The
opinion stressed that unlike in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
Chiras, 432 F3d at 617 n.29; see also Daly,supra note 225, at 16-17.
Chiras, 432 E3d at 617 n.29; see also Daly, supranote 2z5, at 16-17.
228 Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2oo6) (citing
Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 271 F 3 d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9's Cir. zooi)). In Downs v. Los
Angeles Unified School District, the Ninth Circuit dealt with a teacher placing materials on a
bulletin board to object to a school district's support of Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month.
Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 E3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cit. 2000). In response to materials
posted on other school bulletin boards, the teacher posted materials on a bulletin board across
from his classroom with material meant to challenge support for Gay and Lesbian Awareness
Month. Id. The court stated that cases such as Hazelwooddealing with school sponsorship of
others speaking was not involved "because it is a case of the government itself speaking." Id.
at ioi i.Designating the bulletin boards as speech by the district meant that the school could
make content-based choices and did not have to allow dissenting views. Id. at 1Ol 1-12.
229 Daly, supra note 225, at 16 n. 83 (citing Bradley v. Pitt. Bd. of Educ., 91o Fd 1172,
1176 (3d Cir. 199o)).
230 Lee, 418 E Supp. 2d at 821 n.5.
231 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (19910.
232 Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 0995).
233 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
234 Id. at 273.
235 Id. at 263. One story dealt with students at the school who were pregnant and another
dealt with how divorce had affected students attending the school. Id.
236 Id. at 267.
237 Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983)).
226
227
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38
which dealt with independent speech by students that
School District,1
was non-school sponsored, 39 the case before the Court dealt with student
speech sponsored by the school.2" In this context, educators possessed
24
the authority to determine appropriate content standards. ' Also noting
the need to leave educational decisions to educational officials rather
are
than to the courts, the opinion stated that First Amendment concerns
'' 4
1
purpose."
educational
"valid
no
has
decision
a
when
only
implicated
While the Court in Hazelwood stated that Tinker dealt with non-school
sponsored speech, the Tinker decision also has loomed in the background
43
as courts have dealt with teachers claiming independent speech rights.
Tinker dealt with school officials attempting to prohibit students from
wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War and to show their
support for a truce to hostilities.2 " When school officials learned of the
plan, a policy was adopted that prohibited the wearing of armbands and
permitted the suspension of students until returning to school without
an armband. 41 At the outset of its analysis, the Court stated that though
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,
[First Amendment rights] are available to teachers and students. It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
' 46
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
Describing this assertion as unremarkable and consistent with almost
fifty years of precedent, the majority characterized the school policy as
infringing on "'pure speech"' that in no way affected the "work of the
schools or the rights of other students."' 4 7 The majority held that to prohibit
expression the school had to demonstrate a disruption to the learning process
rather than "a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."248 The Court discussed that
49
schools are not meant to operate as "enclaves of totalitarianism." The
majority in Tinker referred to the Keyishian decision and how schools serve
as a "marketplace of ideas," including the premise that promoting speech
50
has implications both inside and outside of the classroom.

238 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
239 Id. at 505-06.
24o Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
241 Id.at 273.
242

Id.

243 See, e.g., Evans-Marshall, infra Part IV-A-2.
z44 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504-05 (1969).
245 Id.at 504.
246 Id.at 506.
247 Id. at 508.
248 Id. at 509.
249 Id. at 511.
250

Id.at 512.
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An obvious reason for the attraction of Hazelwood as appropriate
in evaluating teachers' speech claims is because the case involved
communications involving some degree of school participation or
sponsorship. The Tenth Circuit, for instance, as shown in Miles v. Denver
Public Schools, has used this sponsorship rationale as a basis to evaluate
5
teacher speech using Hazelwood."
' The court declined to apply Pickering
because that case dealt with the school as an employer rather than as an
educator and was concerned with permitting public employees to comment
on matters of public concern."' 2
InMiles,the court also stated that no reason existed to distinguish between
speech by students or teachers in applying the principles of Hazelwood.53
The case dealt with communications by a teacher, Miles, to students that
the quality of the school had declined over the years, using a rumor about
two students "'making out"' on school grounds to illustrate his assertions. 54
As a result of the statements regarding the rumor, the teacher was placed
on administrative leave for four days during a school investigation and had
a letter of reprimand placed in his personnel file. 5 5 Using Hazelwood, the
court concluded that the school had a legitimate pedagogical justification
for the actions taken against the teacher, stating that the administrative
leave afforded time for school officials to investigate the incident and the
letter served to discourage Miles from making comments in the future that
might "reflect negatively on individual members of the student body.251 6
Other courts have used Hazelwood to permit school officials to exert
substantial control over the in-class speech of teachers. Using Hazelwood
as a basis for the authority of school officials to control teachers' classroom
speech, the First Circuit has stated that a regulation is permissible if it is
"(1) ... reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical concern ... and (2) the
school provided the teacher with notice of what conduct was prohibited." 5 7
The Seventh Circuit, applying the Tinker-Hazelwoodstandardsto determine
that school boards are "not free to fire teachers for every random comment
in the classroom," '58 expressed in the same opinion that "there are only
limited constitutional constraints on the form and content of decisions of
local school boards acting within the bounds of their statutory powers. 2 9
These judicial statements, like those in the Miles case, illustrate
that Hazelwood has often served as a basis for substantially restricting
251

Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 E2d 773, 777 (ioth Cir. 199I).

252

Id.

253
254
255
256

Id.

Id. at 774.
Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 778.

257 Ward v. Hickey, 996 E2d 448,452 (ist Cir. 1993).

258 Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631 F2d 1300,1305 (7th Cir. 1980).
259 Id.at 1305.
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teachers' First Amendment rights in the classroom. Still, Hazelwood,
mandating that school officials are prohibited from acting without any
legitimate pedagogical reason in restricting teachers' in-class speech and
potentially requiring that teachers receive some degree of notice that a
speech category or topic is prohibited, may provide limited protection for
in-class speech. Nevertheless, the degree of protection afforded by courts
to teachers under Hazelwood generally stands far removed from the kinds
of speech protections associated with academic freedom. Instead, courts
have generally relied on Hazelwood as a means to emphasize the authority
of school authorities to control teachers' in-class speech.
2. Pickering-Connick Standardsto Evaluate Teachers' In-Class Speech.-As
noted in the discussion of the Garcetti majority opinion in Part I-B, under
the Pickering-Connick standards courts first consider whether the public
employee is engaging in speech on a matter of public concern. If the
employee is not speaking on a matter of public concern, then the employee's
speech lacks First Amendment protection.260 If the employee is speaking
on a matter of public concern, courts then determine whether the interests
of the public employer trump any First Amendment protections otherwise
possessed by the employee.16' Garcetti, of course, added a threshold
question that asks whether the public employee has spoken pursuant to
carrying out his or her employment duties . 61 However, as discussed in Part
II-B, courts are not in unison that this threshold inquiry should apply to
teachers. Courts also differ as to whether in-class related speech that deals
with curriculum constitutes a matter of public concern.
As shown in Sixth Circuit cases, treating curricular related speech as
a matter of public concern permits some degree of First Amendment
protection for in-class speech. In Evans-Marshallv.Boardof Education,the
Sixth Circuit considered a challenge to a teacher's non-renewal that was
grounded in the First Amendment.161 The teacher, who had previously
received satisfactory to outstanding ratings on performance evaluations,
became a target of protest from parents concerned about what was perceived
as inappropriate materials used in-class. 64
During the course of the complaints against the teacher, the principal
stated in front of the school's other English teachers that Evans-Marshall
was "on the 'hot-seat' because of parental complaints at a school board

26o For instance, in Connick the Supreme Court determined that most of the issues listed
on the attorney's questionnaire dealt with internal workplace matters rather than issues of
public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
261 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.41°,48 (2OO6).

Id. at 42 1.
263 Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ.428 E3d
264 Id. at 226-27.
262

223,

226 (6th Cir. 2005).
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meeting over the teacher's use of the book Siddhartha.65 In one of his
formal reviews of Evans-Marshall, the principal instructed the teacher to
clear "[a]ny material containing graphic violence, sexual themes, profanity,
suicide and alcohol" with the English department's chairs." 6 For the first
time, the principal also recorded negative comments concerning Evansz67
Marshall's teaching.
In response to statements in the formal evaluation that the teacher should
clear certain content with the department's chairs, the teacher responded
that novels used in her class' 6s had been approved by the school board.169
At one point during the school year, the teacher also showed a movie,
Romeo+Juliet, rated PG-13, a film adaptation of Shakespeare's play.170 The
teacher received another formal review with additional negative comments,
with the principal stating that problems previously identified had not been
addressed sufficiently to merit a teaching contract for the following school
year.2 7' Eventually, the school board approved the recommendation of the
district's superintendent not to renew Evans-Marshall, who challenged that
the non-renewal stemmed from her "curricular and pedagogical choices"
in violation of her First Amendment rights."'
In analyzing Evans-Marshall's claims, the Sixth Circuit applied the
Pickering standards to evaluate a teacher's First Amendment claims for
in-class speech. 73 The court first looked to see if the teacher commented
upon an issue of public concern and, if so, the inquiry then turned to
whether the school had a sufficient reason to take an adverse action against
the teacher. 74 The court discussed that the Sixth Circuit had determined
that speech constituted a public concern as long as it was related to
"political, social or other community concerns. 2 75 The opinion addressed
that the Supreme Court had never designated classroom communications
as speech for First Amendment purposes, but it had also "never removed
in-class speech from its presumptive place within the ambit of the First
265

Id. at 226.

266 Id. at 227.

267 Id.at 226-27.
268 The novels were Fahrenheit451, To Kill a Mockingbird,and Siddhartha.Id. at 227.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 228.
274 Id. at 228-29.
275 Id. at 229 (quoting Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F3d io36, 1o52 (6th
Cir. 2002). In Cockrel, the court held that a teacher's selection of a guest speaker constituted
speech and that the teacher's speech touched on a matter of public concern protected under
the Pickering balance test. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1048-55. The teacher invited a speaker on
several occasions to talk to students about the uses of industrial hemp, which though not used
to produce marijuana, was banned in Kentucky. Id. at 1042.

2oo8-2oo9]

SILENCE AT THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE

Amendment." '76 The court cited both Tinker and Keyishian for support that
teachers are not bereft of First Amendment rights in the classroom, noting
that teachers are not required to relinquish their First Amendment rights
and that schools are meant to serve as a marketplace of ideas. 77 According
to the opinion, "The assumption that the [Supreme] Court would draw a
distinction between the schoolhouse gate and the doors of the classroom is
2 78
counterintuitive."
Using the Pickering standards, the court determined that the teacher's
selections of the novels and movie involved speech that dealt with matters
of public concern.179 The Sixth Circuit, noting that both books and movies
constituted speech, stated that "assignment by a public school teacher
of protected materials is itself 'speech' within the meaning of the First
Amendment." 8 ° After determining that the teacher's selection of the books
and the movie constituted speech, the opinion, assuming that the teacher
taught the main themes presented in the works, stated that issues presented
in the assigned materials clearly related to matters of public concern."8 '
Moving to the balancing portion of the Pickering-Connick standards,
the court concluded that, based on the facts alleged by the plaintiff, it was
inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss. 8 Evans-Marshall claimed that
the school board had in fact given approval to use the books in question;
the court stated, "We have previously concluded that the prior approval of
controversial speech by the school or the Board undercuts the interests of
the state in controlling the workplace.""83 She also alleged that teachers
2 84
were not required to obtain permission to show a movie rated PG-13.
The court held that "[s]uch allegations are sufficient to establish protected
FirstAmendment activity under the Picketing test, at least for the purposes of
28 5
a motion to dismiss."
In contrast, other circuits have designated speech related to curricular
issues as not a matter of public concern. In Boring v. Buncombe County
Board of Education, for instance, the Fourth Circuit considered the First

276 Evans-Marshall,428 E3d at

229.

277 Id.
278
279
28o
281

Id.

Id. at 23 1.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 230-31 ("For instance, in teaching To Kill a Mockingbird, it is reasonable to

infer that Evans-Marshall taught the themes of race and justice in the American South. Such
content is clearly a matter of public concern.... The same can be said of the other disputed
works: spirituality (Siddhartha), the intersection of love and politics (Romeo + Juliet), and, of
course, government censorship of books (Fahrenheit451).").
282

Id. at 231.

283 Id.

284 Id.
at 232
285 Id.
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Amendment right of a teacher to select a play for students to perform at a
drama competition that contained mature subject matter.2 8 6 The teacher
claimed that she was impermissibly transferred based on allowing students
to act in the play." 7 Relying on Connick and a Fifth Circuit decision, s88 the
court adopted the position that speech related to curriculum does not relate
to a matter of a public concern. 89 In discussing curriculum, the opinion
turned to a dictionary definition and the Supreme Court's Hazelwood
opinion to determine that the curriculum consists of more than just
speech occurring in the classroom.2 90 Based on this inclusive definition of
curriculum, the court determined the play constituted curricular speech, 91
which meant that selection of the play was not a matter of public concern
and was "nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute." ' For good
measure, the court asserted that even if the teacher enjoyed some degree
of First Amendment protection, which it believed she did not, the school
had demonstrated a legitimate pedagogical interest in wanting to shield
the students from the subject matter of the play. 93
B. In-Class Speech by Teachers PostGarcetti
It remains uncertain whether the standards set forth in Garcetti will
ultimately apply to the speech of teachers. The Mayer court did not
hesitate to apply Garcetti, 94 but not all courts, including those using the
Pickering-Connickstandards, have concluded that Garcetti applies. In Lee v.
York County School Division, the Fourth Circuit considered a post-Garcetti
case involving a teacher challenging the removal of items from bulletin
boards in his classroom. 95 The court, looking to the Boring decision and

286 Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ.136 E3d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 1998). A scene
from the play was also performed for a class at the school where the teacher taught, and
students were required to have parental permission to view the scene. Id.
287 Id.at 367.
288 Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 795 (5th Cir. 1989). In the case
the Fifth Circuit considered a challenge by a high school history teacher that he was dismissed
for including books contained on a supplemental reading list that were not approved by
school officials. Id. The court determined that the teacher's supplemental reading list did not
constitute a matter of public concern and noted that he had not spoken out publically against
the board's supplemental reading list policy or complained to colleagues. Id. at 8oo.
289 Boring, 136 F3d at 368-69.
29o Id. at 367-68. Daly, supra note 225, has criticized this dual use of Hazelwood and
Pickering-Connickto evaluate First Amendment claims by teachers.
291 Boring, 136 F3d at 368.
292

Id.

293 Id. at 370.

Mayer v. Monroe County Cmry. Sch., 474 E3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007).
295 Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F3d 687,689(4th Cir. 2007). The school's principal
removed several items from a Spanish teacher's bulletin board that the principal considered
294
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its reliance on Pickering-Connick, determined that curricular speech was at
issue and there existed no matter of public concern that qualified to receive
First Amendment protection.1z 6 While the court relied on Boring and its
standards derived from the Pickering-Connickstrand of cases, the court did
not apply Garcetti to the case, stating instead that it remained uncertain
whether the decision applied to the speech of teachers. 97
For courts using the Pickeing-Connick standards, the impact of applying
Garcetti to teachers' in-class speech relates to whether such speech may
constitute a matter of public concern. The Garcettidecision would appear
to make a minimal difference for courts that already deny protections
to teachers for in-class speech by automatically designating these
communications as not a matter of public concern. Further, as shown by the
Boring decision, curriculum or in-class related speech encompasses more
than communications taking place in the classroom. 98 Garcetticould further
erode protections for courts excluding curricular speech as constituting
a matter of public concern in the area of non-curricular communications
occurring outside the classroom but still deemed to have occurred in the
context of carrying out employment duties, such as talking to students
in the hall between classes or on school trips. In contrast to those courts
not permitting in-class related speech to rise to a level of public concern,
applying the Garcetti standards to evaluate teachers' speech claims would
reduce the potential First Amendment protections that the Sixth Circuit
has provided to in-class related speech. Under Garcetti, there would no
longer be an analysis regarding whether in-class communications raised a
matter of public concern, because such speech would appear to take place
pursuant to fulfilling one's employment duties.
For courts using a Hazelwood approach to evaluate in-class related
speech, using the Garcetti standards could limit the First Amendment
protections for teachers under certain circumstances. While courts using
Hazelwood to evaluate teachers' speech have often left control over inclass speech to the discretion of school officials, this standard has served
as a basis to require prior notice to teachers that certain areas of speech

overtly religious. Id. at 691. The principal had stated in a deposition that an unwritten policy
existed at the school that, though bulletin board content was at the discretion of teachers, such
content was subject to removal and that "inappropriate postings include items that violate
the FirstAmendment, that are offensive, that use profanity, or that are otherwise unrelated to
curricular objectives." Id. at 690. The teacher countered that no written policy existed and
that the materials were not meant to promote his particular religious views. Id. at 691. While
the teacher acknowledged that the items did not relate directly to the teaching of Spanish, he
argued that the items expressed a positive message for students and that a "teacher could post
most anything in a classroom and make it relevant to the curriculum being taught." Id.
296 Id. at 694.
297 Id. at 695 n. i i.
298 Boring, 136 F3d at 368.
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are prohibited.2 99 Hazelwood also requires that schools have some sort
of legitimate pedagogical reason for restricting teachers' speech. While
not necessarily providing extensive protections for communications by
teachers, the Hazelwood approach has provided a legal framework resulting
in at least minimal First Amendment protections for in-class related speech.
Evaluating teachers' in-class speech using Garcetti would erase even this
modest level of First Amendment protection.
C. Competing Views of Teachers' In-Class Speech
As courts continue to consider the appropriate legal standards to evaluate
in-class or curricular-related speech by teachers, especially in the wake
of the Garcetti decision, a basic issue that arises involves the appropriate
role of school officials, especially school boards, in regulating teachers' inclass speech. Should teachers, from a First Amendment perspective, ever
engage in independent in-class speech, or should they simply function as
speech proxies for state and local school boards? Kevin G. Welner divides
debates over First Amendment rights for teachers on the basis of competing
camps.3°° One camp conceives of teachers and schools "as a vehicle for
teaching American youth shared values and norms."30° Conversely, "[t]he
302
other prominent perspective sees the school as a marketplace of ideas.
As Welner discusses, these competing viewpoints create ideological and, at
times, judicial fault lines concerning whether or not teachers merit some
degree of First Amendment protection for in-class related speech. The
Mayer and Evans-Marshalldecisions highlight this disparate conception of
the role of teachers and learning at the elementary and secondary levels.
The Evans-Marshallcourt looked to Tinker and Keyishian to support the
view that teachers, in addition to helping inculcate values, also play an
independent role in helping students develop into critical thinkers capable
of meaningful participation in a democratic society.30 3 For the Mayer court,
a key and reasonable concern focused on teachers seeking to impose their
completely personal views and values on students in a captive classroom,
one caused by the compulsory nature of elementary and secondary
education. The court could point to an elected school board as providing
a sort of democratic vetting process for the information that students are
required to receive. 3"
Arguing from a marketplace of ideas perspective, Karen Daly proposes
the protection of speech by teachers as a way to counterbalance the power
299 Ward v. Hickey, 996 E2d 448,452
300 Weiner, supra note 4, at 965.
301 Id.
302

(1st

Cir. 1993).

Id.at 966.

303 Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 E3d 223, 229 (6th Cir. 2005).
304 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmy. Sch., 474 E3d 477,479-80 (7th Cir. 2007).
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of school boards and to prevent them "from monopolizing speech in public
schools, potentially creating the 'pall of orthodoxy' condemned by the
Supreme Court."3 5 She argues that standards drawn from either Picketingor
Hazelwood currently applied by courts are inadequate to evaluate the First
Amendment rights of teachers. 3°6 Daly contends that courts should engage
in a balancing test using principles derived from Hazelwood, but providing
more protection for teachers than courts have previously recognized.3" 7
In advocating for greater First Amendment rights for teachers, Daly
discusses that courts should also consider the right of students to receive
information.30 While this position has obtained uneven legal traction,3
supporters can look to Boardof Educationv. Pico, where the Supreme Court
limited the authority of school board members to remove certain works from
a school library.310 The Court discussed that "just as access to ideas makes
it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and
press in a meaningful manner, such access prepares students for active and
effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which
they will soon be adult members." ' Rather than grounding the decision
in the academic freedom of teachers or librarians, the opinion discussed
the importance of the right of individuals to receive information.3"' The
Court also underscored that the library involves the voluntary choice of
books rather than materials assigned in a compulsory course.313 The Court
rejected that school officials enjoyed "unfettered" authority over the school
library, but did acknowledge that school officials enjoy substantial discretion
in control of school libraries so long as that authority is not "exercised in a
314
narrowly partisan or political manner."
While authors such as Daly and Welner argue for greater First
Amendment protection for teachers, the general trend has been for courts
to restrict First Amendment rights for teachers. Courts often view the
political process, in the form of elected school boards, as the preferred
305 Daly, supra note 225, at 46.
306 Id. at 6-16.
307 Id. at 52-62.
308 Id. at 31-38.
309 See, for example, Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., where the court, though
acknowledging the right of secondary students to receive information as a constitutional
interest, rejected that students have a right to contest censoring of books and non-renewal of
English teachers. Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp, 631 F.zd 1300, 1304-05 (7th Cir. 198o);
see also Daly, supra note 225, at 33.
31o Bd.of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-72 (1982).
311 Id.at 868.
312

Id. at 866-67.

313 Id.at 869.
314 Id. at 853 (emphasis added). The Court may have also been influenced by the fact
that the board initially established a committee to review the books and then went against the
committee's recommendation. Id. at 857-58.
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method to determine curriculum in elementary and secondary schools.315
As in Mayer, courts also often point to the compulsory nature of education
as a reason for leaving curricular and pedagogical decisions to elected
school boards. Unlike a university student who voluntarily chooses to
take classes at a particular institution or from particular professors, public
elementary and secondary students do not engage in such voluntary
choice. The compulsory nature of education means that rather than the
choices of individual teachers, the democratic political process is preferable
to determining what messages students receive. As discussed by Welner,
the Supreme Court has recognized as well the authority of schools, within
certain limits, to inculcate values in students as opposed to being focused
on serving as a marketplace of ideas.36 A significant function of elementary
and secondary schools recognized by courts is to impart values, and strong
advocates of control over teacher speech contend, with some merit, that
the views and values presented in the classroom should not be left to the
idiosyncratic whims of individual teachers.
The problem with the rhetoric in a case like Mayer concerning the
need for school officials to be able to control teachers' in-class speech is
equating even modest First Amendment protections for teachers with
potential chaos in the curriculum. Even courts sympathetic to teachers'
speech have recognized the dominant role of school boards in determining
curricular and pedagogical matters. 317 Accordingly, schools are not facing
a problem of elementary and secondary teachers armed with extensive
First Amendment academic freedoms running amok in the classroom and
disregarding the approved curriculum. Instead, the reality confronting
courts, and schools for that matter, involves whether teachers should be
31s
bereft of even limited First Amendment protections for in-class speech.
Potentially, the Garcettidecision may mark the final chapter in a general
trend towards the dissolution of First Amendment rights for public school
teachers. Garcetti may most adversely and seemingly unfairly affect the
limited rights of teachers by eliminating any kind of requirement that some
notice be given that a certain speech topic is prohibited. In evaluating the
First Amendment standards that should apply to teachers' in-class speech,
courts need to look beyond simple rhetoric that casts democratically elected
school boards versus individualistic teachers seeking to impose their views
315 See, e.g., Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch., 474 F3d 477,479-80 (7th Cir. 2007); see
also Welner, supra note 4, at 967-72.
316 Welner, supra note 4, at 975-80.
317 See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 Fzd 448, 452 (ist Cir. 1993) (stating "[t]hrough varying
tests courts have afforded schools great deference in regulating classroom speech").
318 In Evans-Marshall,for example, the court did not challenge the authority of school
officials to regulate the in-class speech of teachers, but denied a motion to dismiss in part
based on allegations by the teacher that the school district had in fact already approved the
novels used by the teacher and had not required prior approval to show PG-13 films. EvansMarshall v.Bd. of Educ., 428 F3d 223, 231-32 (6th Cir. 2005).
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and values on captive students. As discussed in this Article, even those
courts that are sympathetic to teachers' speech rights consistently recognize
the authority of school boards and officials to determine curricular standards
and to regulate teachers' in-class communications. One pressing issue
facing courts concerns the existing modest limits on the authority of school
officials, including restrictions on the discretion to discipline teachers for
in-class speech that has not been prohibited or for speech that is related
to the selection of district-approved novels or movies. Far from a battle
for control over the classroom between the school board and its teachers,
courts, in considering applying Garcetti to teachers' classroom speech, must
decide whether teachers merit modest First Amendment protection for inclass communications, namely some kind of reasonable notice that certain
categories of speech are prohibited.
CONCLUSION

In sweeping away from the purview of the First Amendment a
whole category of public employee speech relating to performing one's
employment duties, the Garcetti decision enacted a legal standard that
maximizes the authority of government as employer. This standard is
troubling in a public school context in several respects. By providing no
exceptions, even for special circumstances, the Garcetti opinion means
that a public school employee may be disciplined for sounding the alarm
in situations where financial fraud exists or, most importantly, where the
well-being of students is at stake. The uneven protections afforded under
state whistleblower statutes means that teachers may or may not be able to
look to such laws as an alternative means of protection in reporting official
misconduct or wrongdoing.31 9 As shown in Casey,30 another problem with
Garcetti is that employees may be subject to discipline for complying with
statutory reporting requirements, a possibility that is as bewildering as it is
troubling. Instead of communicating with supervisors, employees may look
to circumvent the official channels of communication or remain entirely
silent, often to the detriment of students and the community, in order to
avoid the risk of retaliation.
Because of the benefit of hearing the views and concerns of employees,
school districts may want to enact internal whistleblower policies or develop
other mechanisms that permit employees to communicate concerns without
fear of retaliation. 311 Organizations that represent school administrators or
319 See generally Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection,38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99 (2000).
320 See supra Part 11-A.
321 Though beyond the focus of this Article, it may be desirable to include provisions
in state and federal education laws that prohibit retaliation against employees engaging in
communication to comply with reporting requirements.
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teachers or both may likewise want to explore ways to provide assistance
for school employees on how, when warranted, to communicate concerns to
the larger community without relinquishing all claims to protection under
the First Amendment. The facts from a case like Cioff32 highlight that at
times the public benefits from the speech of teachers and administrators,
especially when seeking to protect students and garner attention from
school supervisors and boards who have become disengaged from
important matters. In exceptional circumstances, such as when the health
or well-being of students is at issue, school districts should not default to
an unsound legal standard that does not promote good educational policy
or outcomes.
It remains undetermined if Garcetti applies to the in-class speech of
teachers. The case may stand as the final stage in the loss of FirstAmendment
rights for teachers' in-class related communications. Rather than marking
a stark contrast between the authority of school boards and unfettered First
Amendment rights for teachers, applying Garcettito teachers' speech would
mean that public elementary and secondary teachers would be denied
even the slight to moderate First Amendment protections for in-class
.speech that some courts have provided. Courts may want to give serious
consideration to the desirability of treating teachers, who communicate on
a variety of topics with numerous students and often must speak in an
extemporaneous fashion, as serving only as the speech proxies for school
boards. Instead, courts should engage in a realistic assessment of the types
of communications engaged in by teachers and the modest consequences
that might result from providing limited First Amendment protections for
their in-class speech. The reality is that rather than causing unreasonable
discretion for teachers to control speech in their classrooms, sensible First
Amendment protections for teachers' in-class communications would
result in minimal safeguards to protect educators from arbitrary discipline
or retaliation.
Garcetti marks a significant, some would say troubling, decision in
sweeping away communications made by public employees pursuant
to fulfilling their employment duties from the purview of the First
Amendment, and public school employees especially may feel the full
brunt of this bright-line rule. States and school districts may want to
examine the negative consequences that could result from overreliance on
this decision. In exceptional circumstances, common sense suggests the
desirability of making sure that school employees are not deterred from
communicating legitimate, good faith concerns. After Garcetti states and
individual school districts should make sure that adequate safeguards exist
to protect at least certain communications by public school employees.
With teachers' in-class speech, courts should consider that modest First

322

See supraPart II-A.
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Amendment protections are far removed from causing school boards to
relinquish their control over the curriculum and what takes place in the
classroom. The Garcettistandards may hamper beneficial speech by public
education employees, and courts and school officials should carefully
consider the costs of denying public school employees some form of
protection for speech made pursuant to fulfilling their teaching or other
employment duties.

